The moment he became Prime Minister Boris Johnson became an arch remainer. His one overriding goal is to remain in 10 Downing Street. Having been selected by c150k Tory party members on the basis that he would achieve Brexit, and having the example of what happens to PM’s that fail he devised a strategy which would secure Brexit come what may.
The problems he faced were a hopelessly divided legislature, a slim majority and a pressure group within the Conservative Party who were not for compromise. In these circumstance Mr Johnson decided the strategy to achieve his goal would be, “no ifs, no buts, no-deal”. However he needed cover for what would happen if he failed by 31 October, and also, for if he succeeded.
If he failed his credibility with the electorate might be shot and in any subsequent election he would face losing votes to Mr Farage. If he succeeded and Yellowhammer came home to roost he might be fighting an election with growing queues at ports, disrupted holidays, food and drug shortages and who knows what other disruptions.
Plan A was to have a snap election and get majority to deliver Brexit. When Jeremy Corbyn refused to play the part offered to him a revised strategy was needed. This involved ensuring that the blame for; a) not securing Brexit, or b) securing Brexit would fall on others.
It is almost certain his first and final offer to the EU will not be acceptable, it is becoming increasingly clear it was never meant to be. If they had rejected it outright he would have claimed foul and that it was the fault of the EU we have crashed out. Again they refused to play ball and are considering what they know is a non-starter. At the coming summit it will become clear that it is not workable. There will then be a lot of manouvering and synthetic anger by Boris and his team trying to portray the Europeans as intransigent and unwilling to negotiate in good faith. This is a tactic we see more and more often in politics where a party will do something outrageous but attempt to hide it by accusing the other side of doing the exact same thing.
Following all the sound and fury we will get to the point where the Ben Act comes into play. Mr Johnson then faces the dilemma, should he really attempt to overcome the Ben Act, crash out of the EU and risk an election in the context of Yellowhammer, or should he manouver himself into a position where he appears to have been forced to accept an extension, then have an election where the risk is Mr Farage is able to portray him as another failed Brexit leader.
It looks as though he is opting for the latter, pinning his hopes on a “people versus parliament” election. He must have calculated the combination of die in a ditch Brexiters and more widely held Brexit fatigue will produce him a majority which he can then apply to taking the UK out of the EU in January. He is probably correct in assuming that Brexit fatigue might quickly evaporate following a no deal departure.
Like most carefully crafted battle plans, Mr Johnsons did not survive the first engagement with the enemy. People refused to behave as they were supposed to. The tactics that have survived are about attempting to threaten and bully and lie their way to Brexit. It is a moot point whether this will be successful.
However, elections are unpredictable as Theresa May found to her cost. There is no certainty about what the election result will be. And there is no doubt it will be anything other than a Brexit election. What happens then if the popular vote is for remain candidates but the electoral result is a leave majority in parliament? Who knows?
There are only two things that I think are clear, first, Mr Johnson’s steadfast commitment to leaving Europe, second his absolute commitment to remaining in 10 Downing Street.